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International Transportation Law
ANDREw

M.

DANAS, JASON WILSON DROUYOR, AND

JANE

HONG*

International transportation encompasses a variety of modes of transport
and industries, including passenger and cargo transportation by air, ocean,
motor, and rail transportation. This report highlights some of the 2016
legal developments that will affect global trends in international
transportation in coming years. More specifically, the ocean shipping
industry experienced significant disruption through the adoption of a global
weight verification system plus the bankruptcy of Hanjin lines. Both the
ocean and air industries adopted new restrictions on environmental
pollution, while the ocean and automobile industries experienced record
penalties and settlements for the deliberate violation of anti-pollution
regulations. Automation of transportation services was also the subject of
regulatory and judicial developments, with new regulations and guidelines
for drones, self-driving vehicles, and ride-sharing services.
I.

Ocean Shipping

A.

SOLAS

OPERATIONAL SAFETY THROUGH CONTAINER WEIGHT

VERIFICATION

(VGM)

On July 1, 2016, the International Maritime Organization's (lIMO) new
regulations to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention went into
effect.' Originally adopted on November 21, 2014, these regulations require
that the weight of a container be verified by the shipper.2 The rationale for
these requirements was to ensure safe handling of containers in international
maritime trade. Their 2016 worldwide implementation had a direct effect
on shippers, port authorities, and international carriers.
One method to determine the verified gross mass (VGM) stated in the
amendment to the SOLAS convention requires that the packed container be
* This chapter was compiled by Andrew M. Danas. Andrew M. Danas is a Partner with

Grove, Jaskiewicz and Cobert LLP in Washington, D.C., and is Co-Chair of the American Bar
Association Section of International Law International Transportation Committee (ITC). Jason
Wilson Drouyor is a JD Candidate at Georgia State University College of Law and contributed
the ocean shipping and NHTSA Cybersecurity sections. Jane Hong is Manager & Counsel at
International Advisers, the Netherlands, and contributed the section on drones. All other
sections were contributed by Mr. Danas. The ITC thanks Ana Luisa Castro Cunha
Derenusson, co-chair of the ITC, and Roberta Fagundes Leal Andreoli of the Sao Paulo, Brazil
law firm of De Luca, Derenusson, Schuttoff e Azevedo for their assistance.
1. Maritime Safety Committee Res. 94/21, annex 1, Amendment to the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, As Amended, at 1 (Nov. 21, 2014).
2. Id. at 2.
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weighed with calibrated and certified equipment.3 The second method
allows the weight of all contents in the container, including pallets, to be
added to the tare weight of the individual shipping container.4 But the
method must be approved by the country where the container was packed.
Confirmation of method two was a point of contention in many countries
and was not clarified as the July 1, 2016 implementation date arrived. In the
United States, confirmation was given on April 28, 2016, when the United
States Coast Guard released a statement stating that the existing United
States regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, 29 CFR § 1918.85(b),
satisfies the SOLAS convention.s Shippers were then left to figure out how
to comply with these codes and how to submit VGM to the ocean carriers.
Adding to the global confusion about the implementation of the new
SOLAS regulation was the fact that each ocean carrier adopted their own
methods and protocols for VGM submission, which created confusion for
many shippers, especially those that utilized more than one ocean carrier.
Carriers, like Maersk, tried to cut through the confusion by explaining the
VGM requirement, why it was needed, and their individual procedures for
submission.6
Further confusion occurred due to the lack of standardization between
port operations. While the regulations do not require VGM submission
until loading of the container, some United States ports stated that
containers that have not already submitted VGM would not be allowed to
enter the port.7 Other ports agreed to provide weighing services and
electronically submit them to a carrier that has established such a
connection.8 As shipping continues into 2017, it is expected that adoption of
industry and government procedures implementing the SOLAS VGM
regulations will be clarified.
B.

HANjiN SHIPPING BANKRUPTCY

The most disruptive legal event in the international maritime industry in
2016 was the surprise August 31, 2016 bankruptcy filing in a South Korean
court by Hanjin Shipping. The bankruptcy was not a complete surprise
because the ocean carrier had already been undergoing voluntary
3. Id. at 2.1.
4. Id. at 2.2.
5. U.S. COAsT GUARD,

MSIB Bull. No. 009/16, U.S. DECLARES AN
VI/2 oF, THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
SAFETY oF LIFE AT SEA (SOLAS) (2016).
6. What is Verified Gross Mass?, MAERSK LINE, http://www.maerskline.com/en-us/shippingservices/verfied-gross-mass (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
7. Bill Mongelluzzo, Californiaterminals open door to potentially weighing containers,JOC (June
2, 2016, 7:39 PM), http://www.joc.com/regulation-policy/transportation-regulations/
international-transportation-regulations/la-long-beach-oakland-terminals-open-doorpotentially-weighing-containers_20160602.html.
8. Id.
EQUIVALENCY

COMMANDANT,
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restructuring with its creditors since May 2016.9 Hanjin's operations halted
when it filed for bankruptcy after failing to secure support from its largest
creditor, Korea Development Bank.10 Within days of Hanjin's filing of
bankruptcy, Hanjin vessels were being arrested and denied berthing by port
authorities throughout the world.], While creditors and port operators were
immediately working to prevent their losses, Hanjin began to file for
bankruptcy protection throughout the world. 12
As a major carrier in the Transpacific trade, Hanjin sought Chapter 15
bankruptcy protection to seek recognition of the South Korean bankruptcy
proceedings. In the United States, Hanjin filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy
protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New
Jersey. Hanjin sought and obtained a judicial stay to protect its ships from
arrest and to facilitate the discharge of its customers' cargo from Hanjin
ships. Provisional protection was granted by the New Jersey bankruptcy
court on September 6, 2016, with a continued hearing scheduled for
September 9, 2016.13 Although Hanjin was granted temporary protection,
no Hanjin vessel entered United States territorial waters to discharge cargo,
and it was reported that one vessel began its return to Korea.'1 After hearing
claims by multiple parties looking to enforce their liens against ships
chartered by Hanjin, the court upheld Chapter 15 protection on September
20, 2016.15 The result of this judgment required claimants to seek relief in
Korea where Hanjin originally filed for bankruptcy.
The United States Bankruptcy Court's order also authorized cargo
interests and third parties to enter into commercially negotiated agreements
to allow the unloading of Hanjin vessels. In other countries, where the
equivalent of Chapter 15 bankruptcy procedures and protections do not
exist, Hanjin ships were the subject of arrest. Cargo remained detained, and
in some cases, unloaded and undelivered.

C.

ASSERTION OF MARITIME LIENS TO SUBSTITUTED PROPERTY

On October 17, 2016, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in World Imports v. OEC Group, which held that a Non-Vessel-Operating
9. Xiaolin Zeng, Creditors OK Hanjin debt restructuring,JOC (May 4,2016, 3:25 PM), http://
www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/hanjin-shipping/creditors-ok-hanjin-debt-

restructuring_20160504.html.
10. Hanjin Shipping to Seek Receivership After Losing Banks' Support, FoirruNi (Aug. 31, 2016,)
http://fortune.com/2016/08/3 1/hanjin-shipping-receivership/.

11. Andreas Illmer, Hanjin Ships, cargo and sailorsstranded at sea, BBC (Sep. 1, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/business-37241727.
12. Bankrupt Hanjin Seeks courtprotection for its ships, BBC (Sep. 5, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/

news/37273067.
13. In re Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd, No. BR 16-27041, 2016 WL 6681169 (D.NJ. Sept. 16,
2016).
14. Id. ¶ 8.
15. Id. 1 9.
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Common Carrier's (NVOCC) maritime lien remained valid despite delivery
of the goods to which the lien originally applied.16
The case hinged upon whether waiver of the lien was given by OEC when
delivery of the cargo was made to World Imports. The Third Circuit
reversed a ruling by the lower court holding that such a waiver had occurred,
and instead ruled that the trial court erred by characterizing OEC delivery
of the cargo as unconditional and thus effecting waiver of a maritime lien.17
The Third Circuit cited various documents stating that OEC intended for
its maritime lien to survive delivery.'s These documents included the credit
agreement between the two companies and the bill of lading for the various
shipments."
The Third Circuit also rejected the main argument made by World
Imports that contractual provisions stating OEC's intent to retain its lien
were unenforceable. The Third Circuit noted that maritime liens do have
the ability to attach to substituted property, and that the freedom to contract
allows parties to agree or curtail such an occurrence. 20 It placed significant
importance on the documentation that appeared to show World Imports'
consent to the maritime liens surviving delivery. With this new ruling,
carriers may have a contractual framework to impose liens and withhold a
shipment if payment for previous shipments remains outstanding.
H.

Aviation

The year of 2016 has been a defining year for Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS), also known as drones. In the U.S., in particular, new regulations of
the Federal Aviation Administration governing UAS came into effect on
August 2016. The new regulations, set forth in 14 CFR Part 107,21 apply to
commercial use of small UAS (sUAS) weighing less than 55 pounds (25kg),
including payload.22 In essence, Part 107 permits the commercial operation
of sUAS in the National Airspace System (NSA) without a Section 333
Exemption. This means that commercial operators of sUAS do not need to
acquire FAA airworthiness certification.23
Part 107 also creates the Remote Pilot Certificate system, which sets out
operational requirements and limitations, in addition to a Certificate of
16. In re World Imports Ltd., 820 F.3d 576, 592 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, World Imports,
Ltd. v. OEC Group New York, 137 S. Ct. 340 (2016).
17. Id. at 584-85
18. Id. at 585.
19. Id. at 579-80.
20. Id. at 588.
21. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064
(une 28, 2016) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, 119, 133, and 183).
22. Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-95, § 331(6), 126 Stat. 11.
23. Before Part 107, commercial operators of SUAS had to acquire a Section 333 Exemption.
See Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 333.

https://scholar.smu.edu/yearinreview/vol51/iss1/21

4

Danas et al.: International Transportation Law
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

2017]

341

Waiver process. 24 In particular, an operator of sUAS must obtain a Remote
Pilot Certificate.25 Also, a Remote Pilot in Command must maintain visualline-of-sight of the vehicle, fly the vehicle during daytime or civil twilight
with appropriate anti-collision lighting, and not operate the vehicle over
non-participants.26
The new regulations also provide that a single sUAS operator cannot
operate multiple sUAS, and that a maximum groundspeed of 100 mph and
maximum altitude of 400 feet above ground level must be observed.27 To
note, a foreign-registered sUAS is allowed to operate in NSA if the
requirements of 14 CFR Part 375 are met, although foreign-certified UAS
pilots should obtain a Remote Pilot Certificate issued by the FAA.28
111.

International Transportation Environmental Developments

The regulation of environmental pollution by transportation companiks
saw several key developments in 2016, both in the development of
regulations and standards aimed at curbing pollution, and in the
enforcement of criminal fines for the violation of existing regulations.

A.

NEw AIR

AND

OcEAN

EMIsSIONS STANDARDS

In the area of reducing environmental pollution, both the international air
and ocean transportation industry saw the adoption of new regulatory
guidelines in 2016. Both of these developments were in response to the
adoption of the 2015 Paris Climate Accord, which specifically carved out the
air and maritime areas from its global environmental provisions.
In the aviation industry, on October 6, 2016, the 191 States of the United
Nations International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 39th Assembly
adopted ICAO Assembly Resolution A39-3, which agreed to control C02
emissions from international aviation through a new global market-based
measure (GMBM).29 While details need to be worked out prior to
implementation, the resolution reflects an effort to create a global carbon
market whereby airlines will be obliged to offset their C02 emissions to
effect carbon-neutral growth.
Rules for the GMBM will be developed over the next two years. The
pilot phase of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for
International Aviation (CORSIA) will be implemented from 2021 through
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

14 C.F.R. § 107.53, supra note 21.
Id. § 107.12(2)(b).
Id. § 107.29(b), § 107.31(a).
Id. § 107.51(a)-(b).
Id. § 107.12(2)(c).

29. Historicagreement reached to mitigate internationalaviation emissions, ICAO (Oct. 6, 2016),
http://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/Historic-agreement-reached-to-mitigate-internationalaviatnon-emissions.aspx.
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2023.30 The first phase will commence from 2024 through 2026. Both the
pilot and first phases of CORSIA are voluntary. With certain exemptions,
implementation in the phase from 2027 to 2035 would require all States on
board.31
With respect to ocean shipping, in October 2016 the Marine
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) agreed at its 70th session to implement a global sulfur
cap of 0.50% m/m (mass/mass) in 2020.32 The current limit of 3.50% m/m
has been in effect since 2012. The regulations governing sulfur oxide
emissions from ships are set forth in the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from ships (MARPOL Convention), Annex VI.
This Annex sets standards for controlling emissions from ships, including
sulfur oxides (SOx), through a set of progressively stricter regulations.33
Under the standards adopted for 2020, ships will be required to use fuel
on board with the lower 0.50% m/m sulfur content. 34 The new
requirements can be met through using low-sulphur compliant fuel oil;
alternative low emissions fuels, such as gas and methane; or Flag-State
approved equivalent methods, such as exhaust gas cleaning systems or
"scrubbers."
The 0.10% m/m limit for the IMO SOx Emissions Control Areas (ECAs)
will remain unaffected by the new standards. Established under MARPOL
Annex VI and in effect since January 1, 2015, the ECAs consist of the Baltic
Sea area; the North Sea area; the North American area (covering designated
areas off the coasts of Canada and the United States); and areas around the
U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.35

B.

TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENTAL

FINES

AND

PENALTIES

Record fines and penalties for violations of environmental regulations
were also seen in the transportation industry in 2016. Two cases involved
record fines and settlements.
30. U.N. Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Assembly Res. A39-3 (2016), in Assembly
Resolutions in Force, at 1-82, ICAO Doc. 10075 (2016).
3 1. Id.
32. Press Briefing, IMO, IMO sets 2020 date for ships to comply with low Sulphur fuel oil
requirement (Oct. 28, 2016) (available at http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/

Pages/MEPC-70-2020sulphur.aspx).
33. Marpol Annex VI, U.S. ENvix. PRo-r. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/
marpol-annex-vi (last visited Apr. 11, 2017); Prevention ofAir Pollution from Ships, IMO, http://
www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Air-

Pollution.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2017).
34. Marine Environment Protection Committee Res. 70/18, annex 6, Effective Date of

Implementation of the Fuel Oil Standard in Regulation 14.1.3 of MARPOL Annex VI (Oct. 28,
2016). See Press Briefing, supra note 32.
35. See IMO sets 2020 date for ships to comply with low Sulphur fuel oil requirement, supra

note 32.

https://scholar.smu.edu/yearinreview/vol51/iss1/21

6

Danas et al.: International Transportation Law
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

2017]

1.

343

Volkswagen Emissions Scandal

In June, 2016, Volkswagen agreed to spend up to a record USD $14.7
billion to settle allegations that it had cheated on emissions tests in violation
of Unites States environmental laws and that it had deceived customers on
its 2.0-liter diesel vehicles.36 In January 2016, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) filed a civil complaint against
Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche alleging intentional violations of the United
States Clean Air Act. Volkswagen was alleged to have equipped certain of its
diesel vehicles with illegal software which only turned on its full emissions
controls during testing for vehicle compliance with United States or
California emissions standards. The use of this "defeat device" allegedly
resulted in the vehicles meeting emissions standards during lab testings, but
not in real world driving situations. Volkswagen was alleged to have
improperly certified that these vehicles complied with the emissions
requirements of the Clean Air Act.
In March of 2016 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also sued
Volkswagen for allegedly using deceptive advertising campaigns promoting
"clean diesel" Volkswagens and Audi cars. On June 28, 2016, Volkswagen
entered into two related settlements with the State of California and the
U.S. Government to settle some of the civil complaints against it.37
In its settlements, Volkswagen agreed to spend up to USD $14.7 billion to
resolve some of the civil complaints. It agreed that it would offer a buyback
and lease termination for approximately 500,000 2.0-liter diesel vehicles sold
or leased in the U.S. It further agreed to spend up to $10.03 billion as
compensation to consumers who participated in the buyback program, plus
$4.7 billion to mitigate pollution from the vehicles.38
The settlements did not fully resolve all of the civil or criminal violations
pending against the companies for the alleged intentional violations of the
federal and state environmental laws. On September 9, 2016, a Volkswagen
engineer pled guilty for his role in the nearly 10-year conspiracy to defraud
United States regulators and United States Volkswagen customers. The
engineer had a significant role in developing the software to cheat United
States emissions devices and subsequent misrepresentations to government
36. Partial Consent Decree at 1, In re: Volkswagon "Clean Diesel" Marketing, Sales Practices,
and Products Liability Litigation, No. 2672 CRB SC) (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2016); Press
Release, U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Volkswagen to Spend Up to $14.7 Billion to Settle Allegations of
Cheating Emissions Tests and Deceiving Customers on 2.0 Liter Diesel Vehicles (une 28,
2016) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-spend-147-billion-settleallegations-cheating-emissions-tests-and-deceiving).
37. Partial Consent Decree, supra note 36 at 1-2; U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Volkswagen to Spend
Up to $14.7 Billion to Settle Allegations of Cheating Emissions Tests and Deceiving Customers
on 2.0 Liter Diesel Vehicles, supra note 36.
38. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Volkswagen to Spend Up to $14.7 Billion to Settle Allegations of
Cheating Emissions Tests and Deceiving Customers on 2.0 Liter Diesel Vehicles, supra note 36.
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officials and consumers that the Volkswagen vehicles met United States
emissions standards and were environmentally-friendly.39
2.

United States v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd.

On December 1, 2016, Princess Cruise Lines Ltd. ("Princess") agreed to
plead guilty to seven felony charges and to pay the largest-ever criminal
penalty-USD $40 million-for violation of U.S. environmental laws.40 In
its plea agreement, Princess admitted that it had deliberately polluted the
seas when one of its cruise ships used a "magic pipe" to illegally dump oilcontaminated waste into the sea. Princess also admitted that the use of the
magic pipe had commenced in 2005 and it had engaged in intentional acts to
conceal and cover up the vessel pollution. The long-term intentional
violation of environmental laws was discovered when a newly hired engineer
reported the use of the magic pipe to the British Maritime and Coastguard
Agency (MCA) when there was an illegal waste discharge off the coast of
England. The MCA then notified the United States Coast Guard, which
conducted its own investigation, during the course of which it was
discovered that other Princess cruise ships had also been intentionally
engaged in these illegal practices.41
Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., is a subsidiary of Carnival Corporation, the
world's largest cruise company. As part of the criminal plea agreement with
Princess, it was agreed that eight Carnival cruise ships from several Carnival
Corporation cruise line companies will be under a court supervised
Environmental Compliance Program (ECP) for five years. Under the terms
of the ECP, there will be a court-appointed monitor and independent audits
by an outside entity.
IV.

Regulating Technology Developments: Autonomous Vehicles

The development and use of autonomous vehicles made significant
advancements in 2016. The first death of a driver in a self-driving vehicle (a
Tesla),42 the testing of self-driving Uber "ride sharing" services in
39. Rule 11 Plea Agreement at 5-6, U.S. v. D-1 Liang, No. 16-cr-20394 (E.D. Michigan)
(Sept 9, 2016); Press Release, U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Volkswagen Engineer Pleads Guilty for His
Role in Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (Sept. 9, 2016) (available at https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-engineer-pleads-guilty-his-role-conspiracy-cheat-us-emissionstests).

40. Plea Agreement, U.S. v Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 16-20897-CR-Seitz, (S.D. Fla.)
(Dec. 1, 2016); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Princess Cruise Lines to Pay Largest-Ever
Criminal Penalty for Deliberate Vessel Pollution (Dec. 1, 2016) (availableat https://www.justice
.gov/opa/pr/princess-cruise-lines-pay-largest-ever-criminal-penalty-deliberate-vessel-

pollution).
41. Plea Agreement, supra note 40, at 2-3.
42. Brian Solomon, Tesla Autopilot Enthusiast Killed In First Self-Driving Car Death, FORBES
(une 30, 2016, 5:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/06/30/the-first-

self-driving-car-death-launches-tesia-investigation/#3d44fb87762e.
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Pittsburgh,43 and the first commercial delivery in the United States using a
self-driving tractor-trailer combination (a delivery of Budweiser beer in
Colorado)44 all pointed to both the fact that autonomous or self-driving
vehicles will increasingly be on the road and the fact that uniform
regulations regarding the design and use of such vehicles on roads may need
to be developed, as will liability and insurance standards.
In the United States, the 2016 regulatory approach to autonomous
vehicles remained piecemeal at the state and local level. But the federal
government issued several sets of guidelines in 2016 which established the
foundation for future federal regulation and best standards practices.
A.

FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY

In September 2016, the U.S. Department of Transportation issued the
United States government's federal policy for the safe testing and
deployment of automated vehicles.45 The policy established Vehicle
Performance Guidance for Automated Vehicles for manufacturers,
developers, and other entities which included a fifteen point "Safety
Assessment" for the safe design, development, testing and deployment of
automated vehicles. It further identified areas of federal and state
responsibilities for regulation with suggested recommended policy areas for
states to consider as well as potential new regulatory tools and statutory
authorities that may aid the deployment of such technologies.
B.

NHTSA

BEST PRACTICES FOR VEHICLE CYBERSECURITY

In October 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) released a best practices guide for vehicle cybersecurity.
Although these guidelines are voluntary, the NHTSA signaled to the
industry the need for cybersecurity to become a priority. The guidelines
even mentioned the need for a "high-level corporate officer" with the sole
task of addressing cybersecurity concerns. 46 The NHTSA release sets a
serious tone for cybersecurity, and presents a comprehensive security
approach.
43. Signe Brewster, Uber starts self-driving car pickups in Pittsburgh, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 14,

2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/14/1386711/.
44. Mike Isaac, Self-Driving Truck's FirstMission: A 120-Mile Beer Run, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/technology/self-driving-trucks-first-mlission-abeer-run.html?_r=0.
45. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Automated Vehicles Policy, https://www
.transportation. gov/av; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Docket No.

NHTSA-2016-0090, Request for Comment on "FederalAutomated Vehicles Policy, 81 Fed. Reg.
65703 (Sept. 23, 2016).
46. U.S. Derr. oF TRANSP., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFFTy ADMIN., DOT HS 812 333,
Cybersecurity Best Practices for Modern Vehicles at 13 (2016), available at https://acquia-dev8
nhtsa.dot.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/ 12333_cybersecurityformodernvehicles.pdf.
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One considerable area of concern identified by NITSA is the security of
the electronic control unit (ECU). The ECU acts as the vehicle's computer
and controls much of the vehicle's systems. The NHTSA guidance worked
to balance the need for security with the need for accessibility.
Notwithstanding a strong push for security by eliminating access to the
ECU, the NHTSA acknowledged that a complete elimination of access may
not be possible due to the need for developers and serviceability by thirdparties.47 Aftermarket consumer products, like insurance driving history
dongles, may also need access.48 NHTSA thus advocated a "layered
approach" to create a framework with multiple levels of access to prevent full
compromises in security.
The NHTSA guidance also focused on cybersecurity throughout a
product's development and life cycle by specifically citing the need to
provide security for the vehicle's "conception, design, manufacture, sale, use,
maintenance, resale, and decommissioning."49 NHTSA recommended using
risk assessments, vulnerability testing, and threat response protocols as ways
to increase security.50 Sharing this information within the industry was also
highly stressed. NHTSA also stated that it had a goal for full industry
participation in Auto ISAC, which was setup in 2015 to help facilitate the
sharing of information.5' Vulnerability and disclosure policies were also seen
by NHTSA as being pivotal to ensure collaboration between manufacturing
and independent testers. 52
Lastly, NHTSA promoted the need for strong self-auditing and review of
the entire cybersecurity framework that is implemented. This includes
periodic threat simulation testing to ensure proper implementation of all
aspects of the strategy.ss It advised that retention of these documents and
revision of protocols is also important to ensure that the framework stays
current with the latest research and information.54
Encompassing many areas of vehicle security, the NHTSA's release of
Cybersecurity Best Practices for Modern Vehicles represents what NHTSA
believes is a "solid foundation" on which to build a cybersecurity framework.
Although it is up to individual companies to voluntarily implement and
improve upon these practices, it remains to be seen as to whether these
practices will be used to develop mandatory regulations or are adopted by
the courts in litigation to establish a minimum standard requirement.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 17, 21.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 8.
U.S. DEPT.

OF

TRANsp.,

NAT'L HIGi-iWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,

DOT HS 812

333, Cybersecurity Best Practices for Modern Vehicles at 14 (2016), available at https://acquiadev-nhtsa.dot.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/812333 cybersecurityformodernvehicles

.pdf.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id.
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Transportation Network Companies

Legal issues surrounding "ride sharing" companies such as Uber and Lyft
continued to be the subject of litigation and regulatory disputes in a variety
of areas and jurisdictions during 2016. These companies, also known as
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) and Transportation Network
Providers (TNPs) generally use a smartphone or computer app to pair
drivers and their vehicles with passengers. The companies claim that they
are basically software companies that help self-employed drivers and
individual customers to use the companies ride-sharing apps to provide and
obtain transportation services. Competitors of these companies, largely
traditional taxi companies, claim that they are basically taxi companies and
should be regulated as such.
Some of the legal developments around the world involving TNCs in
2016 included whether they should be regulated the same as taxi companies,
including licensing and background checks; whether regulating such
companies differently than traditional taxi companies violated competition
and other laws insofar as they deprive taxi companies of the benefits of their
investment in their licenses; and whether drivers for such companies are
employees or independent contractors.
In the United States, Uber, Lyft, and other TNCs were engaged in
multiple lawsuits and legislative initiatives involving these controversies,
including state and local efforts to mandate certain types of driver
background checks and litigation over the proper classification of drivers.
There was no consistent or uniform trend in determining how such
companies should be regulated. Two 2016 decisions, one in the United
States and one in the United Kingdom, illustrate the different conclusions
that courts and regulators are reaching over how to classify and regulate
ride-sharing services such as Uber.
One approach was represented by an October 7, 2016 decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which dismissed
arguments by taxi companies that different and less strict regulatory
standards for ride sharing companies is anticompetitive and an
unconstitutional taking of the property of the taxi companies, in violation of
the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.55 Writing for the
Court, Judge Richard Posner found that taxi and ride sharing companies
were not the same:
The plaintiffs argue that the City has discriminated against them by
failing to subject Uber and the other TNPs to the same rules about
licensing and fares (remember that taxi fares are set by the City) that the
taxi ordinance subjects the plaintiffs to. That is an anticompetitive
argument. Its premise is that every new entrant into a market should be
forced to comply with every regulation applicable to incumbents in the
market with whom the new entrant will be competing.
55. Illinois Transp. Trade Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Here's an analogy: Most cities and towns require dogs but not cats to be
licensed. There are differences between the animals.. .. Dog owners,
other than those who own cats as well, would like cats to have to be
licensed, but do not argue that the failure of government to require that
the "competing" animal be licensed deprives the dog owners of a
constitutionally protected property right, or alternatively that it subjects
them to unconstitutional discrimination. The plaintiffs in the present
case have no stronger argument for requiring that Uber and the other
TNPs be subjected to the same licensure scheme as the taxi owners.
Just as some people prefer cats to dogs, some people prefer Uber to
Yellow Cab, Flash Cab, Checker Cab, et al. They prefer one business
model to another. The City wants to encourage this competition,
rather than stifle it as urged by the plaintiffs, who are taxi owners.56
There are enough differences between taxi service and TNP service to
justify different regulatory schemes, and the existence of such
justification dissolves the plaintiffs' equal protection claim. Different
products or services do not as a matter of constitutional law, and indeed
of common sense, always require identical regulatory rules. The fallacy
in the district judge's equal protection analysis is her equating her
personal belief that there are no significant differences between taxi and
TNP service with the perception of many consumers that there are such
differences-a perception based on commonplace concerns with
convenience, rather than on discriminatory or otherwise invidious
hostility to taxicabs or their drivers. If all consumers thought the
services were identical and that there was therefore no advantage to
having a choice between them, TNPs could never have gotten
established in Chicago.57
The seemingly opposite conclusion that Uber is essentially no different
than a taxi company was reached the same month by a United Kingdom
Employment Tribunal.58 In a decision examining the same business model
examined by the Seventh Circuit, the UK Employment Tribunal ruled that
Uber is essentially a taxi company and Uber drivers are workers for purposes
of the law. Arguably, the Seventh Circuit's decision addressed the question
of whether Uber's services were sufficiently different from a taxi company to
permit it being regulated differently than a taxi company, while the
Tribunal's decision was focused on whether it was providing a transportation
service. Nonetheless the Tribunal's reasoning at paragraphs 86 through 89
of its decision underscores the different conclusions that are being reached
about the fundamental legal status of ride-sharing services. It is worth
quoting in detail:
56. Id. at 597-98.
57. Id. at 598-99.
58. Reasons for the Reserved Judgment on Preliminary Hearing Sent to the Parties on 28
October 2016 at ¶ 89, Aslam, et al v. Uber B.V., et al, Nos. 2202550/2015 & Others, (U.K.).
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86 ... We have reached the conclusion that any driver who (a) has the
App switched on, (b) is within the territory in which he is authorised to
work, and (c) is able and willing to accept assignments, is, for so long as
those conditions are satisfied, working for Uber under a 'worker'
contract and a contract within each of the extended definitions. Our
reasons merge and/or overlap in places, but we will endeavour to keep
the main strands separate.
87 In the first place, we have been struck by the remarkable lengths to
which Uber has gone in order to compel agreement with its (perhaps
we should say its lawyers') description of itself and with its analysis of
the legal relationships between the two companies, the drivers and the
passengers. Any organisation (a) running an enterprise at the heart of
which is the function of carrying people in motor cars from where they
are to where they want to be and (b) operating in part through a
company discharging the regulated responsibilities of a PHV operator,
but (c) requiring drivers and passengers to agree, as a matter of contract,
that it does not provide transportation services (through UBV or ULL),
and (d) resorting in its documentation to fictions, twisted language and
even brand new terminology, merits, we think, a degree of scepticism.
Reflecting on the
Respondents' general case, and on the grimly loyal evidence of Ms
Bertram in particular, we cannot help being reminded of Queen
Gertrude's most celebrated line:
The lady doth protest too much, methinks.
88 Second, our scepticism is not diminished when we are reminded of
the many things said and written in the name of Uber in unguarded
moments, which reinforce the Claimants' simple case that the
organisation runs a transportation business and employs the drivers to
that end. We have given some examples in our primary findings above.
We are not at all persuaded by Ms Bertram's ambitious attempts to
dismiss these as mere sloppiness of language.
89 Third, it is, in our opinion, unreal to deny that Uber is in business
as a supplier of transportation services. Simple common sense argues to
the contrary. The observations under our first point above are
repeated. Moreover, the Respondents' case here is, we think,
incompatible with the agreed fact that Uber markets a 'product
range.'41 One might ask: Whose product range is it if not Uber's? The
'products' speak for themselves: they are a variety of driving services.
Mr Aslam does not offer such a range. Nor does Mr Farrar, or any
other solo driver. The marketing self-evidently is not done for the
benefit of any individual driver. Equally self-evidently, it is done to
promote Uber's name and 'sell' its transportation services. In recent
proceedings under the title of Douglas O'Connor-v-Uber Technologies
Inc. the North California District Court resoundingly rejected the
Published by SMU Scholar, 2017

13

The Year in Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2017], Art. 21
350

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 51

company's assertion that it was a technology company and not in the
business of providing transportation services. The judgment included
this:
Uber does not simply sell software; it sells rides. Uber is no more a
"technology company" than Yellow Cab is a "technology company"
because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi cabs.
We respectfully agree.59
The one conclusion that can be reached between the multitude of court
and regulatory decisions around the world grappling with how to classify and
regulate TNCs is that the contrasting approaches of the Seventh Circuit and
the UK Employment Tribunal decisions will not be the final word on the
subject.

59. Id. J 86-89 (citing Douglas O'Connor v. Uber Tech., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (other footnotes and citations omitted).

https://scholar.smu.edu/yearinreview/vol51/iss1/21

14

